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316 F.3d 412
(Cite as: 316
F.3d 412)
United States Court
of Appeals,
Third Circuit.
Michael ANTHONY,
Individually and on Behalf of all Persons Similarly Situated;
Anne Pasqua; Ray Tolbert
v.
Gerald COUNCIL,
Hon.; [FN*]Lee F. Forrester, Hon., in Their Official
Capacity
as a Judge of the Superior Court, and on Behalf of all Superior Court
Judges
of the State of New Jersey; Deborah T.
Poritz, Hon., in Her
Official
Capacity as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and on
Behalf
of all Superior Court Judges of the State of New Jersey; Richard J.
Williams,
Hon., in His Official Capacity as Administrative Director of the
Courts
of the State of New Jersey, and on Behalf of all Superior Court Judges
of the
State of New Jersey Anne Pasqua, Ray Tolbert and Michael Anthony,
individually
and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Appellants
FN*
Amended in accordance with Clerk's Order dated 8/22/01
No. 01‑2735.
Jan. 17, 2003.
Persons held in civil contempt for failing to
comply with child support orders brought a § 1983 action against New Jersey
state court judges and court administrator, contending the Due Process Clause
establishes a right to counsel, and, if indigent, a right to appointed counsel,
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and class certification. The
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Garrett E. Brown,
Jr., J., abstained under Younger v. Harris, and
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Scirica, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) plaintiffs had standing, but (2) abstention under Younger was
appropriate.
Affirmed.
West
Headnotes
[1]
Federal Courts 
543.1
170Bk543.1 Most
Cited Cases
Court of Appeals is under an
independent obligation to examine standing, even if the courts below have not
passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue.
[2] Civil
Rights 
203
78k203 Most
Cited Cases
Persons held in civil contempt
for failing to comply with child support orders had standing to bring a § 1983
action against New Jersey state court judges and court administrator,
contending the Due Process Clause established a right to counsel, as plaintiffs
alleged they had been injured because of past constitutional deprivations and
were likely to be injured in future child support contempt hearings, there was
a causal connection between the alleged deprivations of plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and the complained‑of conduct by the defendants,
and plaintiffs' injuries could be redressed by a favorable ruling. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[3]
Federal Civil Procedure 
103.2
170Ak103.2 Most
Cited Cases
[3]
Federal Civil Procedure 
103.3
170Ak103.3 Most
Cited Cases
Standing requires the
satisfaction of three elements: first, the plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact, that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and third, it must be likely,
as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.
[4]
Federal Courts 
754.1
170Bk754.1 Most
Cited Cases
[4]
Federal Courts 
813
170Bk813 Most
Cited Cases
Court of Appeals exercises plenary
review over the legal determinations of whether the requirements for Younger
abstention have been met, and if the requirements have been met, Court of
Appeals reviews the district court's decision to abstain for abuse of
discretion.
[5]
Federal Courts 
41
170Bk41 Most
Cited Cases
Younger
abstention only comes into play when an important state interest is implicated.
[6]
Federal Courts 
41
170Bk41 Most
Cited Cases
[6]
Federal Courts 
46
170Bk46 Most
Cited Cases
In order for a federal court to
abstain under the Younger
doctrine: (1) there must be ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in
nature; (2) the state proceedings must implicate important state interests; and
(3) the state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal
claims, but even if the necessary three predicates exist, Younger
abstention is not appropriate if the federal plaintiff can establish that: (1)
the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of
harassment; or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist such that
deference to the state proceeding will present a significant and immediate
potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests asserted.
[7]
Federal Courts 
48
170Bk48 Most
Cited Cases
Abstention under Younger was proper
in § 1983 action against New Jersey judges and
court administrator by persons held in civil contempt for failing to comply
with child support orders, contending the Due Process Clause established a
right to counsel, though plaintiffs were not currently appearing or scheduled
to appear in any particular child support hearing, where each plaintiff was
under a child support order which required continual involvement by the New
Jersey courts, New Jersey had an overriding interest in ordering, monitoring, enforcing
and modifying child support obligations, plaintiffs offered no reason why their
claims could not be fully heard by New Jersey courts, and plaintiffs did not
show bad faith, harassment or other extraordinary circumstance. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.J.S.
2A:4‑30.65, 2A:17‑56.9a, 2A:34‑23; N.J.R.
2:2‑1, 2:2‑3(a)(1), 5:1‑2, 5:7‑
5, 5:25‑3.
[8]
Federal Courts 
41
170Bk41 Most
Cited Cases
Once a party has appeared in
state court and has had an opportunity to present its federal claims in the
state proceedings, a federal court normally should refrain from hearing the
claims, and the party must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the district
court, unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions specified in Younger.
[9] Courts
509
106k509 Most
Cited Cases
The Rooker‑Feldman
doctrine restricts lower federal court review of state‑court judgments
and evaluation of constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with
the state court's decision in a judicial proceeding.
[10]
Federal Courts 
47.1
170Bk47.1 Most
Cited Cases
For purposes of determining
whether there is a pending state court proceeding, supporting abstention under Younger, New
Jersey's comprehensive and fluid system designed to address the ever‑present
and ever‑changing realities of child support orders must be viewed as a
whole, rather than as individual, discrete hearings. N.J.S. 2A:4‑30.65, 2A:17‑56.9a, 2A:34‑23; N.J.R.
5:7‑5, 5:25‑3.
[11]
Federal Courts 
41
170Bk41 Most
Cited Cases
For purposes of the Younger abstention
doctrine, when a state seeks to vindicate its own policies as a party to a
pending state proceeding, an important state interest often is implicated.
*414 David Perry Davis, (Argued), Princeton, for Appellants.
Barbara J. Stoop, (Argued), Office of Attorney General of New
Jersey, Division of Law, Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, for
Appellees.
Before SCIRICA, RENDELL and NOONAN, [FN*]
Circuit Judges.
FN* The
Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
Judicial Circuit, sitting by designation.
*415 OPINION
OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises out of a federal civil rights lawsuit brought
by persons under state court orders for failing to support their children.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 contending the
Due Process Clause establishes a right to counsel, and, if indigent, a right to
appointed counsel. Defendants are New
Jersey state court judges and the administrative director of the New Jersey
courts. [FN1] The District Court abstained under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d
669 (1971). We will
affirm.
FN1. The
District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
I
Plaintiffs, Michael Anthony, Anne Pasqua and Ray Tolbert, are all
under child support orders issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery
Division, Family Part. Because they failed to meet their child support
obligations, they were arrested and incarcerated for civil contempt of a court
order. [FN2]
FN2.
Anthony was arrested on April 19, 2000 and incarcerated. He appeared before defendant Superior Court
Judge Gerald J. Council on May 11, 2000, and was released that same day after
paying $125.00 toward his arrears.
Pasqua was arrested on May 15, 2000, and appeared before defendant
Superior Court Judge Lee F. Forrester on May 18, 2000. Pasqua was incarcerated until June 1, 2000,
when she was released without having made
any payment towards her arrearage.
Tolbert was arrested on March 27, 2000, and held until April 13, 2000,
when he appeared before Judge Council.
Tolbert was incarcerated until June 7, 2000, when he was released
"pursuant to[a] state appellate court order which is not related to this
suit." Pasqua v. Council,
No. 00‑2418, at 3 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2001) (quotations omitted). On June 8, 2000, another hearing was held on
Tolbert's arrearage and after being re‑incarcerated, he was soon released
and placed in a work/training program.
Plaintiffs allege violations of their due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. [FN3] Specifically, they contend the presiding
judges failed to inform them of their right to counsel and, if indigent, to
appointed counsel, and moreover, the judges failed to appoint counsel for
them. Plaintiffs contend they were
indigent at the time of their hearings, continue to be indigent, and remain in
arrears on their support obligations.
As such, they aver there is a great likelihood they will again be
deprived of their asserted rights because in the future they will be obligated
to appear in similar contempt hearings.
FN3.
Plaintiffs' complaint also alleges defendants violated their rights under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article I, paragraph 8 of the New
Jersey Constitution.
The District Court also examined plaintiffs' assertions under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Pasqua, No. 00‑2418, at 2 n.1. But in plaintiffs' appellate
briefs, they do not mention these federal and state constitutional
provisions. Because claims not raised
in their briefs are waived, we will not consider these claims. See, e.g., Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir.2000).
Based on the alleged deprivations and their fear of future
deprivations, plaintiffs sued certain New Jersey judges and the administrative
director of the New Jersey courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (creating liability for individuals who,
"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage"
of a state, subject others "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws"). According to plaintiffs, their
constitutional deprivations occur under court rules and procedures promulgated
and followed by defendants.
*416 Plaintiffs seek the following declaratory and
injunctive relief: a declaration that
defendants' failure to inform them of their right to counsel and to appointed
counsel, as well as defendants' failure to provide counsel, violated their
constitutional rights; and an
injunction preventing future incarceration
without notification of right to counsel and to appointed counsel, and
requiring appointed counsel whenever a hearing might result in a deprivation of
liberty.
Plaintiffs also seek certification of a plaintiff class consisting
of indigent New Jersey residents under child support orders who may appear in
similar contempt hearings. The proposed
defendant class would consist of all New Jersey Superior Court Judges. Finally, plaintiffs seek a preliminary
injunction to immediately remedy the current alleged failures of the New Jersey
court system. [FN4]
FN4. In
addition, plaintiffs ask that defendants be required to review the cases of all
persons currently incarcerated in violation of the constitutional rights
asserted in this suit. Plaintiffs
request attorneys' fees and costs.
The District Court did not reach the merits of the suit. After defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
in Lieu of Answer, the District Court abstained citing Younger
v. Harris. Because it
abstained, the District Court denied plaintiffs' motions for class
certification and a preliminary injunction.
The plaintiffs appeal the decision to abstain and the denial of their
motions. Because this appeal comes to us from a grant of a motion to dismiss
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),
"[W]e accept all factual allegations in the complaints and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs. We may affirm only if it is
certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be
proven." Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d
1406, 1411 (3d Cir.1993).
II
[1][2] Before turning to the merits of
abstention, we address standing.
Defendants did not contest plaintiffs' standing nor did the District
Court address the issue. But we are under
an "independent obligation" to examine standing, "even if the
courts below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the
issue before us." FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230‑31, 110
S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (citation omitted). Upon review, we agree with the tacit
understanding of the parties and the District Court that plaintiffs have
standing in this matter.
[3] As
formulated by the Supreme Court, standing requires the satisfaction of three
elements:
First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact‑‑an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of.... Third, it
must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560‑61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)
(quotations, citations and footnote omitted).
Plaintiffs here meet all three prongs of the standing test.
First, plaintiffs allege they have been injured because of past
constitutional deprivations and are likely to be injured in future child
support contempt hearings. Fears of future
injury are based on the likelihood that plaintiffs, who allegedly remain
indigent, will be summoned again *417 before the New Jersey courts for
failing to meet their support obligations.
Plaintiffs contend they are unlikely to enjoy their asserted rights in
any future hearings. See Scalchi
v. Scalchi, 347 N.J.Super. 493, 790 A.2d 943, 945
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2002) ("The current law in New Jersey
[does not] require that counsel be assigned to an indigent in a support
enforcement proceeding."); Prob.
Servs. Div., Admin. Office of the Courts, Your Guide to Court
Preparation; Answers to Common
Questions About Child Support Enforcement Hearings (n.d.) ("A lawyer will
not normally be court‑appointed for this type of hearing....").
Furthermore, there is a causal connection between the alleged deprivations
of plaintiffs' constitutional rights and the complained‑of conduct by the
judges and administrator who promulgate and follow the current court practice.
Finally, plaintiffs' injuries could be redressed by a favorable ruling of a federal court declaring the actions of the New
Jersey courts unconstitutional and issuing the appropriate injunctions.
Our view on standing is in accord with most decisions rendered in
similar suits. In challenges to current
child support contempt hearings and to threatened future hearings, courts have
explicitly held that plaintiffs have standing.
E.g., Parker v. Turner, 626
F.2d 1, 5 n. 11 (6th Cir.1980) (finding standing for plaintiffs
demanding right to appointed counsel and other due process rights in future
child support hearings); Johnson
v. Zurz, 596 F.Supp. 39, 42‑43 (N.D.Ohio
1984) (finding standing for plaintiffs demanding right to appointed
counsel in current and future child support hearings); Lake v. Speziale, 580
F.Supp. 1318, 1326‑28 (D.Conn.1984) (similar to Parker). Other courts have assumed that plaintiffs
have standing without directly addressing the issue. E.g., Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483
F.2d 1386 (9th Cir.1973);
Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526
F.Supp. 969 (S.D.Ohio 1981). [FN5]
FN5. We are
aware of only one similar case in which a court held a plaintiff did not have
standing, but that case, Mann v. Hendrian, 871
F.2d 51 (7th Cir.1989), isdistinguishable. Mann
focused on prospective relief for one individual to protect against alleged
constitutional deprivations by a single judge.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
believed the plaintiff's alleged future injury was too speculative because he
failed to show he would likely appear before the judge in question in any
future hearing. Id. at
53. Moreover, the court
believed the relief sought was, in part, unnecessary because, at the time of
his federal suit, Mann knew of his right to counsel at state contempt hearings
and thus did not need an order forcing the state court judge to inform him of this
right. Id. at 52‑53.
This suit focuses on a cognizable past injury for which
declaratory relief is sought. The suit
also seeks to prevent future injury for all indigents, notably those unaware of
the rights alleged here, who will appear in child support contempt hearings
before any New Jersey Superior Court judge. Hence, the injury here is not
conjectural or hypothetical nor is the efficacy of the sought remedy
speculative.
III
[4]
Turning to the merits, "[w]e exercise plenary review over the legal
determinations of whether the requirements for Younger abstention have been
met." FOCUS
v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75
F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir.1996).
If the requirements have been met, "we review the district court's
decision to abstain for abuse of discretion." Id.
In Younger, which
involved a First Amendment‑based challenge to California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, the
Supreme Court held that, unless there were extraordinary circumstances, federal
*418 courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions. 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746. The ruling was based on traditional
principles of equity and on considerations of comity. Id. at 43‑44,
91 S.Ct. 746. Younger
defined comity as "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of
the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways." Id. at
44, 91 S.Ct. 746. [FN6]
FN6. In Samuels
v. Mackell, a case decided on the same day
as Younger, the Court held that "the same
equitable principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction must be taken
into consideration by federal ... courts in determining whether to issue a
declaratory judgment, and that where an injunction would be impermissible under
these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as
well." 401
U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971).
[5] Since Younger, the
Supreme Court has extended the doctrine to bar federal interference in other
types of state proceedings. Younger has
been applied to civil enforcement
proceedings and to other civil proceedings "involving certain orders that
are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their
judicial functions." New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989)
(listing Court cases that have expanded the doctrine). Younger has
also been applied to certain state administrative proceedings. See Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477
U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73
L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). The boundaries for the application of
the doctrine remain somewhat elusive.
But from its inception, it has been clear that Younger
abstention only comes into play when an important state interest is implicated.
[6] We
have framed a test to determine when Younger
abstention is appropriate. In order for
a federal court to abstain under the Younger
doctrine:
(1)
there [must be] ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the
state proceedings [must] implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings [must] afford
an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Even if the necessary three predicates exist, however, Younger
abstention is not appropriate if the federal plaintiff can establish that (1)
the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary
circumstances exist ... such that deference to the state proceeding will
present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the
federal interests asserted.
Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.1989)
(citing Middlesex
County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432, 435, 102 S.Ct.
2515).
[7] All
three predicates exist here. Moreover,
there is no showing of bad faith, harassment or some other extraordinary
circumstance, which might make abstention inappropriate. As such, we conclude the District Court was
correct in abstaining in this suit.
A. Pending Proceeding
Ensuring the provision of child support is a function particular
to the states. New Jersey law provides
New Jersey courts with the authority to order and direct the *419
payment of child support. In part, the
statute reads:
Pending
any matrimonial action brought in this State or elsewhere, or after judgment of
divorce or maintenance, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the court
may make such order ... as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of
the children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the
nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just....
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34‑23.
Each plaintiff here is under a child support order. Each order requires continual involvement by
the New Jersey courts. Under New Jersey
law, parents are obligated to provide
support until a child is emancipated. Newburgh
v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031, 1037
(N.J.1982). [FN7] As such, plaintiffs have been, and will
remain, under their child support orders for many years. Throughout the duration of the order, the
New Jersey courts are charged with monitoring, enforcing and modifying the
child support obligations. See N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:17‑56.9a (providing for review and
modification of child support orders); N.J.R.
5:7‑5 (providing for monitoring and enforcement of child
support orders, including the institution of contempt hearings if obligors fail
to make payments); N.J.R.
5:25‑3 (explaining the jurisdiction, duties, powers and
responsibilities of Child Support Hearing Officers). As is apparent, the New Jersey courts have performed their
delegated functions with respect to plaintiffs' child support orders.
FN7.
Emancipation can occur upon a variety of events taking place. The
"[a]ttainment of age [eighteen] establishes prima facie, but not
conclusive, proof of emancipation."
Newburgh, 443 A.2d at 1037. As such, parents may be required to provide
for a child who is older than eighteen, including contributing toward the costs
of higher education. Id. at
1038‑39; see also
Gac v. Gac, 351 N.J.Super. 54, 796 A.2d 951,
955‑58 (N.J.Sup.Ct.App.Div.2002) (explaining that a father may
have to contribute toward the costs of his
daughter's college education).
Plaintiffs contend that, because they are not currently appearing
or scheduled to appear in any particular child support hearing, including a
contempt hearing, there is no "ongoing" or "pending"
proceeding. [FN8] This argument may carry weight in other
types of suits. But given plaintiffs'
specific claims here and the particular nature of child support orders, the
argument is unavailing. [FN9]
FN8. The
adjectives "ongoing" and "pending" are used interchangeably
in the caselaw. References to
"ongoing" or "pending" proceedings are meant "to
distinguish state proceedings which have already commenced from those which are
merely incipient or threatened." Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43
L.Ed.2d 482 (1975).
FN9. In
contrast to child support orders, which endure for many years and require
continual state court involvement, most criminal and civil actions are single,
discrete matters, which have easily identifiable starting and endpoints. That state courts continually monitor,
enforce and modify child support orders makes these particular procedures
unique.
[8][9] In seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, plaintiffs focus retrospectively and prospectively. To the extent plaintiffs address past
contempt proceedings, review is barred by Younger. Once a party has appeared in state court and
has had "an opportunity to present [its] federal claims in the
state proceedings," a federal court normally should refrain from hearing
the claims. Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51
L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (emphasis in original). The "party ... must exhaust his state
appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court, unless he can
bring himself *420 within one of the exceptions specified in Younger." Huffman, 420
U.S. at 608, 95 S.Ct. 1200. [FN10] Plaintiffs here had ample opportunity to
raise any constitutional claims at their state contempt hearings. They also could have appealed any adverse
decision to higher courts. See infra
Section III.C. Instead, they impermissibly attempted to bypass the state system
and to seek relief in federal court.
FN10.
Similarly, the Rooker‑Feldman doctrine restricts lower federal court
review of state‑court judgments and evaluation of constitutional claims
that are "inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a
judicial proceeding." D.C. Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16, 103
S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Because here we affirm abstention under Younger, we do
not address whether the Rooker‑Feldman doctrine applies.
Addressing prospective injunctive relief, plaintiffs' requested
remedies will undeniably interfere with pending state proceedings. In New Jersey, child support orders and the
mechanisms for monitoring, enforcing and modifying them comprise a unique
system in continual operation. Each
plaintiff here is party to an open case that will not terminate until the child
support order is finally discharged.
The New Jersey courts retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
these matters, whether the claims are intrastate or interstate, see N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:4‑30.65 et seq., and the state
courts constantly monitor plaintiffs' compliance with their orders. The New Jersey Probation Division, an arm of
the state judiciary, is charged with oversight and reporting failures in
meeting support obligations. N.J.R.
5:7‑5. The
Probation Division and the New Jersey courts are conferred with authority to
ensure that payments are made and to remedy any failures to pay. Id. [FN11] A New Jersey Superior Court judge may
"revise[ ] and alter" orders "from time to time as circumstances
may require." N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:34‑ 23. Any party, including plaintiffs here, at any time, may request
modification of a support order. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:17‑56.9a.
FN11. The
extent of the state courts' involvement in child support matters is exemplified
in New Jersey Court Rule 5:7‑5. The Rule is entitled:
Failure
to Pay; Enforcement by the Court or a
Party; Income Withholding for Child
Support; Suspension and Revocation of
Licenses for Failure to Support Dependents;
Execution of Assets for Child Support;
Child Support Judgments and Post‑Judgment Interest.
N.J.R.
5:7‑5. As the
title suggests, the Rule provides for various means by which the New Jersey
courts, and the Probation Division in specific, can secure the payment of child
support obligations.
Of
particular note is the continual monitoring by the Probation Division, which
may lead to the institution of contempt hearings if a failure to pay is not
quickly remedied. In part, the Rule
reads:
(a)
Contempt and Relief in Aid of Litigant's Rights. If a person fails to make payments or provide health insurance
coverage as directed by an order or judgment, the Probation Division responsible
for monitoring and enforcing compliance shall notify such person by mail that
such failure may result in the institution of contempt proceedings. Upon the accumulation of a support arrearage
equal to or in excess of the amount of support payable for 14 days or failure
to provide health insurance coverage as ordered, the Probation Division shall
file a verified statement setting forth the
facts establishing disobedience of the order or judgment. The court ... may then, in its discretion,
institute contempt proceedings ... and an aggrieved party, or the Probation
Division on that party's behalf, may apply to the court for relief....
N.J.R.
5:7‑5.
[10] For
purposes of Younger, such a comprehensive and fluid
system designed to address the ever‑present and ever‑changing
realities of child support orders must be viewed as a whole, rather than as *421
individual, discrete hearings.
Plaintiffs have acknowledged as much.
Their request for prospective injunctive relief acknowledges that
because of their indigency and continued arrearages, they will be subject to
future ongoing contempt proceedings.
Thus their request for federal court intervention to prevent alleged
future constitutional violations constitutes impermissible interference with
pending state proceedings.
This holding is in accord with Younger. As the Supreme Court has explained, part of
the purpose of Younger
abstention is to avoid "duplicative legal proceedings" and the
"disruption of the state ... justice system." Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); see also Juidice, 430
U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. 1211.
Federal court ruling and relief here would address issues that
plaintiffs can raise in </
